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EDITORIAL COMMENTS
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONALIZED CONTRACT
The arbitral award in the Texaco/Calasiatic case,' rendered by Professor
Ren6-Jean Dupuy, acting as sole arbitrator, nearly 3 years ago, has received
surprisingly little attention in American legal publications.2 Whatever the
exact reason for this neglect,3 it seems undesirable to let such an important
document pass unobserved. Of course, this comment can deal with only
a few of the major issues involved and must leave to one side several im-
portant problems, in particular those of conflict of laws.
The arbitration concerned the nationalization by Libya of several petro-
leum concessions held by two American companies.4 The award's line of
reasoning may be sketchily summed up: It is held, at the very start, that
international law governs the arbitration's procedure (paras. 11-16) and
that the deeds of concession involved are contracts "within the domain of
international law" (paras. 19-35). The entire contractual relationship is
"internationalized" (paras. 36-52). Nationalization is held to be a breach
of the contracts. This holding is supported by findings that (1) the con-
tracts are not "administrative contracts" (paras. 54-57); (2) the nationaliza-
tion measures, albeit sovereign acts, cannot "nullify" contracts that are in-
ternationalized (paras. 58-79); and (3) the UN General Assembly resolu-
tions purporting to assert exclusive national competence in matters of na-
tionalization are not positive international law (paras. 80-91). Accord-
ingly, the Libyan Government is required "to perform and give full effect"
to the concessions it has breached, restitutio in integrum (as contradis-
tinguished from damages) being, both under Libyan law and under in-
'Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, award dated January 19, 1977, reprinted in
17 ILM 1 (1978) [Eng. trans.]. References hereinafter will be to the "Award," fol-
lowed by paragraph numbers. For the authentic French text of part III of the award,
see 104 J. Dnorr INT'L (Clunet) 350 (1977).
2But see now the valuable discussion in broader context by K. Venkata Raman,
Transnational Corporations, International Law, and the New International Economic
Order, 6 SYRAcusE J. Imrr L. & Com. 17 (1978). The award was also cited and
followed in the Revere arbitration, note 10 infra. For commentaries in Fiench, see J. F.
Lalive, Un grand arbitrage p~trolier entre un Gouvernernent et deux socidtes priv~es
4trangdres, 104 J. DRorr INT'L (Clunet) 319 (1977); Rigaux, Des dieux et des hiros,
67 RE:v. CErIQuE DRorr INT'L Pmrvi 435 (1978); Cohen-Jonathan, L'arbitrage Texaco-
Calasiatic contre Gouvernement Libyen, [1977] ANNuRAmE FRANgAIS DE Dnorr INT'L
452.
3 Surfeit with the overabundant literature on state contracts with aliens may be one
reason. References here are limited to those strictly necessary.
4The nationalization occurred in two phases in 1973 and 1974. Both Libyan de-
crees provided for eventual compensation of the companies; Award, paras. 6 and 7.
Libya did not participate in the proceedings, except for a memorandum objecting to
the arbitration.
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ternational law, "the normal sanction for non-performance of contractual
obligations" (paras. 92-109).
The principal thrust of the award should be apparent even from this bare-
bones summary, which does less than justice to the skill and style of the
master jurist who is its author. The essential points, debated at great
length in the late 1950's and early 1960's,5 concern first, the possibility of
"elevating" contracts between a state and a foreign national to international
status, and second, the legal effects of such internationalization. A third
issue, rarely treated directly in international practice, is that of the place of
rest;tutio in integrum (or specific performance) as a remedy in interna-
tional law.
Once the possibility of some kind of internationalization of contracts be-
tween a state and a foreigner is admitted,6 the question arises of the condi-
tions under which it can be brought about. The instant award lists three
possible manners, any one of which is said to suffice: The contract may refer
to "general principles of law" as the applicable law, it may contain an
arbitration clause, or it may be an "economic development agreement." 7
It is striking that the simplest and most obvious possibility, that of explicit
reference to international law, is not on the list-perhaps because it is ex-
tremely rare, if not unheard of* All three of the methods listed are founded
on more or less distant inferences. Would it not be reasonable, however, to
require that, for such a serious legal consequence to be brought about, an
explicit statement of the intent of the parties should be needed? After all,
the clauses and other indications listed are capable of being given effect in
-- Among recent comprehensive studies, see the valuable survey and analysis in J.
Kuusi, State Contracts with Foreigners: Considerations on Law and Policy (unpub.
thesis, Oxford 1976), and the exhaustive comparative discussion of doctrine, legislation,
and case law on the related issue of arbitration between states and private persons, in
A. Vergopoulos-Michail, Probl~mes relatifs a l'arbitrage en mati~re d'investissements
priv6s internationaux (unpub. thesis, Paris-II 1978). An original theoretical approach
is found in F. RIGAUX, Dnorr PUBLiC ET Dnorr Pslvi DANS LES RELATIONS INTERNA-
TIONALEs 366 fl. (1977). For an impressionistic review of eminent opinions on the
subject, see the reports and discussions in INsTITrr DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, 57
ANNUAIRE 192-265 (1977 I), id. at 318-25 (1977 II).
6The point is not conceded by several eminent jurists and by the great majority of
Third World states. See, e.g., Wengler, Les accords entre Etats et entreprises 6tran-
g~rey sont-ils des traitis de droit international?, 76 REV. GiN. DRorr INT'L PUB. 313
(1972). There is a certain "bootstrapping" quality to the related argument in the
award: Since, according to it, it is international law that authorizes the parties (par-
ticularly the state party to the contract, presumably) to choose freely the applicable
law (para. 35), it must first be found that the contracts involved "are within the do-
main of international law" before proceeding to construe the relevant clause so as to
declare international law the governing law. The assertion that the contracts are inter-
nationalized comes so early in the award (para. 22) that one is not certain how far
each of the subsequent references to it justifies or merely qualifies (or describes)
internationalization.
Award, paras. 40-45. For critical analysis of this section of the award, see Cohen-
Jonathan, supra note 2, at 459-66; Rigaux, supra note 2, at 443-44, 446-49; Vergo-
poulos-Michail, supra note 5, at 98-109.
Compare J. Verhoeven, Contrats entre Etats et ressortissants d'autres Etats, in LE
COINTRAT ECONOMIQUE INTENATIONAL: STABiLrr Er EVOLUTION 115, 141 (1975).
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manners which would not trigger the contract's internationalization. As the
award notes, the "general principles of law" are at best only one of the
sources of international law; they are by no means coextensive with inter-
national law in its entirety., The presence of an arbitration clause can
hardly be construed as necessarily a sign of internationalization-are all
charter parties entered into by states internationalized? In a way, it is the
third, and vaguest, of the bases for a state contract's internationalization that
g;ves away the game: For only where a developing country is the state party
to the contract could this test ever come into effect.10 Thus, existing pre-
sumptions against limiting the sovereign authority of states, a principle as
fundamental in international law as it is widely accepted, are casually re-
versed; inferences (i.e., presumptions) favoring such limitations to the
benefit of private parties are now applied.
Internationalization of the contract, moreover, resolves nothing by itself.
It provides no generally accepted answers to the quest for the legal rules
applicable.,' The only explicit rule the award appears to deduce is that
the principle pacta sunt servanda is applicable, which does not help much.
Any law of contracts, national or international, is bound to start with this
principle. But it cannot just stop there. In reality, the most important
consequence of internationalization is implicit. In simplest terms, once a
contract has moved to the international level, it cannot lawfully be affected
by unilateral, national legal action. Since states cannot invoke their
9 Avard, para. 41. In the case at hand, the contract referred to "the principles of
the law of Libya common to the principles of international law and in the absence of
such common principles . . . the general principles of law, including such of those
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals." Award, para. 23. The
award construed this clause as in essence a reference to international law. Libyan
law was considered in 4 instances, at a high level of abstraction, and in no case was
it found not to coincide with international law. Construing the same clause, Judge
Lagergren, in the BP arbitration, emphatically rejected the general applicability of
international law, insisting on the role of the general principles of law. See G. WErEn,
1 Ti INTERNATIONAL AnBTrrAL PnocEss 432, 437-39 (1979), and see infra notes
21, 26.
10 The excessive looseness of the related argument, gently criticized ia the otherwise
favorable comment by Professor Cohen-Jonathan, supra note 2, at 466, and scathingly
attacked by Rigaux, supra note 2, at 456-58, is confirmed by its use in the Revere
arbitration, Revere Copper, Inc. v. O.P.I.C., August 24, 1978, reprinted in 17 ILM
1321 (1978). The majority opinion in that award found it possible to hold that a state
contract was internationalized, in the absence of either a reference to international law
or to general principles of law or an arbitration clause, merely because it involved the
exploitation of natural wealth and resources. This holding formed the basis for a find-
ing that the alleged breach by the host Government of a tax stabilization clause (a
clause held to be unconstitutional and therefore ineffective by the national Supreme
Court concerned) constituted an "expropriation," under the terms of a guarantee con-
tract between the company and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. See, in
this connection, the dissenting arbitrator's opinion, id. at 1372 ff.
"1 Compare Verhoeven, supra note 8, at 140-41. In fact, differing conceptions of
the substantive rules to be applied underlie (and undermine) much of the apparent
consensus among various writers on this topic. See Fatouros, The Adm.'nistratlve Con-
tract in Transnational Transactions: Reflections on the Uses of Comparison, in Jus
PHIVATUm GENTrUM. FEsrscmuFr Fil MAx RHEINSTEIN 259, 262 (1969).
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sovereignty to abrogate an international treaty, it is argued, neither can
they do so to alter an internationalized contract.
This last proposition is treated as self-evident in the award (paras. 66-68,
91), yet it involves an interesting transformation in the nature of the ap-
proach used. The possibility of internationalization is founded on affirma-
tion of the diversity and multiplicity of the possible subjects and rules of
international law. As the award points out, "treaties are not the only type
of agreements governed by [international] lav. . . . [C]ontracts between
States and private persons can, under certain conditions, come within the
ambit of a particular and new branch of international law: The interna-
tional law of contracts" (para. 32). Once international law is thus opened
up, however, its vaunted diversity somehow disappears. The rules actually
applied are those of traditional international law, at its strictest; but if the
"international law of contracts" is identical in content with the international
law of treaties, why is it necessary to stress the distinction? If the
multiplicity of subjects and kinds of international law is to have any mean-
ing, there has to be at least a possibility of variation in legal outcomes. To
fashion an appropriate body of law, based on "general principles of law"
and on international practice, the relevant inquiry must be directed at the
principles applicable in fact to state contracts in national law'1 and at the
abundant recent experience with nationalizations and other types of inter-
ference with state contracts. The award at hand contents itself instead,.in
the first place, with a brief reference to the doctrinal notion of the contrat
administratif, as elaborated in French law, concluding that such a precise
notion is not found in other legal systems, 13 and, in the second place, with
an offhand dismissal of recent practice as inconclusive, on the ground that
it has "been inspired basically by considerations of expediency and not of
legality." II
A disregard of state practice, in favor of doctrinal pronouncements
and a small number of arbitral awards, marks much of the argumentation
in the award ", but is particularly noticeable in the paragraphs leading to
12 This is not the place, of course, for an elaboration of other approaches to this by
no means novel question. For earlier attempts, see Fatouros, supra note 11; A. FATOU-
ROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 196-209, 261--301 (1962).
And compare W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 200
if. (1964); Weil, Un nouveau champ dinfluence pour le droit administratif francais: le
droit international des contrats, [1970] ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL DETAT 13.
23 Award, para. 57. The sole arbitrator refers on this point to the discussion of
"general principles of law" by the late Wolfgang Friedmann, citing page 196 of The
Changing Structure of International Law (1964), while curiously failing to mention
that a few pages later the same book strongly supports the application of the contrat
administratif concept to concessions and similar state contracts (pp. 200 ff.). And
see on the comparative law of public contracts, J. D. B. MITCHELL, THE CON RACTS
OF PUBLIC AvTrOrrrms: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1954); Langrod, Administrative
Contracts, 4 Am[. J. ComP. L. 325 (1955); Bolgar, The Public Interest: A Jurispru-
dential and Comparative Overview of the Symposium on Fundamental Concepts of
Public Law, 12 J. PUB. L. 13, 34-51 (1963).
14 Award, para. 69. Shades of Barcelona Traction! Compare 11970] ICJ REP. 3, 40.
1- See, e.g., Award, paras. 65-69, where citation of 2 earlier investment arbitrations,
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its holding that restitutio in integrum is in international law the normal
remedy for breach of contract (paras. 96-109). Earlier studies have pointed
out that, while the common assertion in doctrinal writings has been that
restitutio is the "normal" remedy and damages the "exceptional" one,10 state
practice, both diplomatic and judicial, "follows a pattern which is exactly
the opposite of the one accepted in theory. In practice, compensation con-
stitutes the principal remedy, restitutio being clearly an exceptional one." 17
In the relatively few contested cases where restitutio has been ordered or
agreed, compensation generally would have been insufficientis
While admitting that some of the better known judicial assertions of
the principal character of restitutio are mere obiter dicta, the award in-
vokes their manner of formulation and repeated citation to argue that
they constitute "a principle of reasoning having the value of precedent"
(para. 98). Major reliance is placed on a string of quotations from emi-
nent authors, asserting in varying ways the primacy of restitutio, and on
the findings of a single recent study favoring this position." The award
dismisses the cogent argumentation to the opposite effect of an earlier
study 20 by labeling it "isolated" and by referring to the arguments in an
unpublished legal opinion submitted by the plaintiffs (para. 102 ad finem).
Surprisingly, there is no mention of a very recent award, in a case on all
fours with the one here involved, where the sole arbitrator appears to have
held that restitutio in integrum is not in international law the principal
a quotation from the late Charles de Visscher, and certain inferences from a PCIJ
judgment and a UN General Assembly resolution are capped by the bald assertion:
"Such is the present state of international positive law."
10 One should note that, in many instances, the relevant passages in doctrinal writings
are subject to differing interpretations. References to the standards for the assessment
of compensation (e.g., "monetary compensation must, as far as possible, :.esemble resti-
tution," per Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, as quoted in the Award at para. 102) do not neces-
sarily imply acceptance of the primacy of restitutio as a remedy.
3. A. FATouRos, GOVEHNMNT GUARANTEES, supra note 12, at 311-12. There is,
moreover, no cogent reason in theory or policy to accept the traditional position; id.
at 312-13. The award honors my book with quotation of an earlier passage, which it
construes as descriptive (id. at 310-11, quoted in Award, para. 103); it does not ad-
dress itself to the conclusions reached a page or two later.
18 See infra note 19.
19 The study in question is, M. Bernad Alvarez de Eulate, La "restitutico in integrum"
en la prdctica y en la jurisprudencia internacionales, 11 TEzis, REv. GiENdIA & TCNICA
JTRfDicA 11-40 (Zaragoza, Nos. 29-32, 1971-72). The article is a summary of the
author's doctoral thesis. In a prefatory footnote, Professor Dupuy, among others, is
thanked for his help. Dr. Bemad goes over a long listing of cases, the ovevhelming
majority of which concern classical instances where compensation would have been
manifestly insufficient: release of persons, delivery of ships, and restitution of works of
art, documents (and sums of money (1)), and of territory. As to these, and as to some
more problematic cases (involving, e.g., declarations of validity or invalidity of national
measures), it is not clear from the necessarily brief summaries how far tle outcome in
each case was determined by the compromis, by the stipulations of the parties, etc.
Apparently, none of the studies directly challenging the legal validity of the traditional
formulation of the principle was available to Bemad.
2o Baade, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts--A Reply, 54
AJIL 801 (1960).
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remedy21 More important, there is no reference to the fact that what is
involved here is what was called "the international law of contracts" rather
than the law of treaties. Surely, if the imposition of the strict remedy
of restitutio might possibly be justified in some cases, as between states,
it is much harder to defend such a limitation on a state's freedom of action
within its territory for the benefit of private persons. Better to understand
this section of the award, one should keep in mind Professor Rigaux's
astute observation that the holding as to restitutio was in fact what the
entire arbitration was about, since Libya had already stated that it would
compensate the companies concerned.22
The award's treatment of the UN General Assembly resolutions com-
monly associated with the proclamation of the "new international economic
order"3--the award's second "unique" feature, according to counsel for
the plaintiff -4-faces a similar problem. We may leave to one side, for
present purposes, the broader issue of the significance for international
law of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and other
related documents.-5 The issue here is more limited. It is settled legal
learning that the impact of legal norms is relative: To reach a conclusion
the comparative strength of the norms on each side of a given conflict
must be assessed. Here, the legal effect of the NIEO instruments is to
be considered, not as against the international law rules concerning the
treatment of aliens, or those regarding the exercise of diplomatic protec-
tion, but as against the norms constituting the "international law of con-
tracts." The latter is at best a fragile structure, based (according to its
proponents) on the capacity of states to assume binding legal obligations
toward private persons, as evidenced by some state practice, a handful of
arbitral awards-in most of which only one party participated 26--and,
;A The award in question is BP v. Libya, C. Lagergren, sole arbitrator, award ren-
dered October 10, 1973; supplementary award, August 1, 1974. The award has not
yet been published in full; relevant information and excerpts are printed in G. WErr-a,
supra note 9, at 408-10, 432-40. See also infra note 26.
2, Rigaux, supra note 2, at 439-40. It does not appear that the plaintiffs had claimed
such compensation or had argued that whatever Libya offered or proposed to offer was
unfair or inadequate. Several months after the award was rendered, a settlement for
$152 million in crude oil was agreed upon; see R. von Mehren, Introductory Note, 17
ILM 1, 2 (1978).
;. UNGA Res. 3201 (S-VI), May 1, 1974, Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order, 13 ILM 715 (1974); UNGA Res. 3202 (S-VI),
May 1, 1974, Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, id. 720; UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX), Dec. 12, 1974, Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, 14 id. 251 (1975).
;. R. von Mehren, supra note 22, at 1.
-z On its "delegitimizing" impact, in the areas we are here concerned with, see
Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1, 7-8 (1976); Castaiieda, La Charte des Droits et Devoirs 6conomiques des Etats
du point de vue du droit international, in R. FLORES CABALLERo, J. CASTAinEDA, Er AL.,
JUSTICE iCONOMIQUE iNTEaNATONALE 75, 112-13 (1976); and more comprehensively,
R. MEAGHER, AN INTEINATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND PowER: A STUDY
OF THE CHARTER oF ECONOMtIC RiGHTs AND DUTIES oF STATES (1979).
L11 Such one-sided proceedings are hardly likely to lead to full investigation of the
1980]
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by no means least, a veritable mountain of legal writing, not all of it from
impartial sources. Relevant authoritative instruments barely suggest the
contents of its norms. Against this structure is arrayed another set of
norms, consisting of formal and repeated assertions of exclusive and in-
alienable national jurisidiction over natural wealth and resources by a
large majority of the world's states. The latter norms may not be (yet)
positive international law, but is their total legal effect so minimal as not
to counterbalance the gossamer rules of the "international law of con-
tracts"? 27 One wonders.
Better to understand the Texaco/Calasiatic award, one must put it
in historical perspective. It reflects a significant doctrinal (and to a
far lesser extent practical) trend which started in the 1950's and peaked
sometime in the mid-1960's. Based in major part, but by no means exclu-
sively, on the concern of Western ("First World") lawyers for the protec-
tion of foreign investors in developing countries, and strengthened by the
lack of legal sophistication in many of these countries at that time,2 this
trend soon also encompassed attempts at formulating moderate or compro-
mise positions, international legal norms that would ensure the freedom
of action of host countries as well as a minimum standard of protection for
investors..2 9 Such positions, however, were generally a minority. From the
very start, the most forceful and vocal elements in support of the trend
saw in it a means for removing state contracts from the domain of public
law, which is generally sensitive to the heterogeneity of public and private
interests, and applying to them instead principles appropriate for contracts
between homogeneous parties. These principles were found, in the main,
in the international law of treaties, A body of law intended to govern for-
mal instruments concluded between public collective entities, deemed
equal (and homogeneous) in the eyes of the law, and thus in fact stricter-
in the sense of allowing fewer exceptions to general rules and imposing
fewer "public order" requirements-than even the law of private contracts
in developed national legal systems. In this manner, the qualitative dif-
ferences between the public and private interests at stake on each side
issues, however sensitive to the problem the arbitrator may be, as Professor Dupuy
demonstrably was; see, e.g., Award, para. 74. The sole arbitrator's failure to
mention the Lagergren award, supra note 21, which had reached differing conclusions
on several of the issues raised in the Texaco/Calasiatic case, is best seen as an illustra-
tion of the inherent limitations of such proceedings. Indeed, if the arbitrator under-
takes to consider too critically the plaintiff's submissions, by taking inlo account the
possible legal arguments and approaches of the nonparticipating defendants, he runs
the risk of being accused of overstepping the bounds of (nominally) adversary pro-
ceedings.
27A possible opening of ati inquiry along such "relative" lines might be offered by
the discussion of the right to nationalize in paras. 76-79 of the award.
28 This element was stressed in a seminal article on the subject, McNair, The General
Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 23 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1957).
29 A standard, however, that would be genuinely minimal and not reflect the strictest
property-protection norms of market economies, as the traditional "international mini-
mum standard of treatment of aliens" tended to do, as far as the economic interests of
aliens were concerned. The position here referred to is that associated with the late
Wolfgang Friedmann and others.
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were assumed away, and the "internationalization" of state contracts led,
paradoxically, to their "privatization." In much of the doctrine and in the
limited practice extant, the trend points to a pervasive limitation of the
host state's sovereign authority within its own territory.
The predominance of such conceptions has combined with changing per-
ceptions on the part of developing countries to limit acceptance of this
approach. Conditions and attitudes have by now radically changed.30
The willingness to reach substantive compromise on legal principles and
norms has evaporated.3' The contractual approach to development, which
15 years ago seemed to offer new possibilities for cooperative action, has
been wrecked by the pace of economic and social change, which makes
predictions (and promises) hazardous. Developed countries have frozen
themselves in a maximalist position, symbolized by the "prompt, adequate
and effective compensation" formula. Developing countries, through na-
tional and international action, have generally sought to ground their posi-
tion on an unqualified assertion of national sovereignty and jurisdiction.
Their effort to develop national legal and administrative structures and
norms has led to a marked reversal of the earlier receptiveness to the "in-
ternationalized contract" approach. 32 In their actual practice on concrete
issues both sets of countries are far more flexible than their formal pos-
tures suggest. Yet, efforts on the official level to give theoretical form to
such practice have been few and far between.
These trends were clearer a few years ago. Since the mid-seventies, the
impact of the world economic crisis and of long-range domestic problems
has seriously undermined the will and vigor of both developing and devel-
oped countries in the pursuit of international development. The outcome
is profoundly unclear. We may be moving toward another effort at com-
promise on principles and practices for development; witness the current
negotiations for the international regulation of foreign investment (trans-
national corporations and technology transfers). Such a movement might
even encompass a revival of the "internationalized contracts" approach,
presumably in a form more responsive to developmental realities and
needs. But there are few if any certainties left. By reviving an approach
out of what now looks like a distant past, the Texaco/Calasiatic award
has made evident the extent of the change that has taken place and has
illuminated our present impasse.
A. A. FATouaos
31 For an excellent summary of the situation, see the conclusions in Kuusi, supra
note 5, at 258-64.
"3 The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, is the
most durable remnant of these efforts at compromise, through linguistic ambiguity as
much as through genuine concessions on all sides.
32 See Kuusi, supra note 5, at 239-51. It is characteristic in this respect that several
of the Iranian and other petroleum arrangements, whose references to "general prin-
ciples of law" are cited in the award (e.g., paras. 41-42), have been amended so as to
exclude such language since the early 1970's. See Kuusi, at 239-51; Vergopoulos-
Michail, supra note 5, at 100-03. And see now, the revised version of the thesis by
J. Kuusi, supra note 5, The Host State and the Transnational Corporation. An Anal-
ysis of Legal Relationships (1979).
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